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Abstract
Concrete particular objects (e.g. living organisms) figure saliently in our everyday ex-
perience as well as our in our scientific theorizing about the world. A hylomorphic
analysis of concrete particular objects holds that these entities are, in some sense,
compounds of matter (hūlē) and form (morphē or eidos). The Grounding Problem
asks why an object and its matter (e.g. a statue and the clay that constitutes it) can
apparently differ with respect to certain of their properties (e.g. the clay’s ability
to survive being squashed, as compared to the statue’s inability to do so), even
though they are otherwise so much alike. In this paper, I argue that a hylomorphic
analysis of concrete particular objects, in conjunction with a non-modal conception
of essence of the type encountered for example in theworks of Aristotle andKit Fine,
has the resources to yield a solution to the Grounding Problem.
1. The Grounding Problem
Coincidence theorists, also known as ‘pluralists’ or ‘multi-thingers’,
hold that numerically distinct objects can occupy the very same
region of spacetime, while ‘monists’ or ‘one-thingers’ deny this
claim. Why should we believe that numerically distinct objects can
occupy the very same region of spacetime? Consider, for example, a
statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it. In a typical case,
these objects differ, among other things, with respect to their tem-
poral properties: one comes into or goes out of existence before or
after the other. But we can certainly imagine a case in which the
statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it come into and go
out of existence at exactly the same time, as is the case for example
in Allan Gibbard’s well-known scenario involving Lumpl and
Goliath:1
I make a clay statue of the infant Goliath in two pieces, one the
part above the waist and the other the part below the waist.
Once I finish the two halves, I stick them together, thereby
1 Allan Gibbard, ‘Contingent Identity’, Journal of Philosophical Logic
4 (1975), 187–221.
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bringing into existence simultaneously a new piece of clay
[‘Lumpl’] and a new statue [‘Goliath’]. A day later I smash the
statue, thereby bringing to an end both statue and piece of clay.
The statue and the piece of clay persisted during exactly the
same period of time.2
Even if the statue and the piece of clay imagined by Gibbard are
indiscernible with respect to their temporal properties, they never-
theless appear to differ with respect to other properties. If indeed
there are such properties with respect to which coincident objects
differ, then Leibniz’s Law dictates that these objects are numeric-
ally distinct, even though they occupy the very same region of
spacetime.3
What are these properties with respect to which coincident objects
appear to differ? Prominent examples of such properties which are
apparently not shared by coincident objects include the following:
de re modal properties (e.g. being essentially or accidentally statue-
shaped); sortal or kind properties (e.g. being a statue or being a
lump of clay); properties pertaining to their persistence conditions
(e.g. being capable of being squashed or not being capable of being
squashed); as well as evaluative or other types of properties (e.g.
being innovative, valuable, well-made, expressing a certain content,
etc.).4 Perhaps some of these apparent differences can be explained
in terms of others, so that some of these properties may turn out to
be derivative (or more derivative than others), while others may
turn out to be basic (or less derivative than others). Karen Bennett
calls those properties with respect to which coincident objects can
apparently differ ‘sortalish’ properties; and she calls the remaining
2 Gibbard, ‘Contigent Identity’, 191.
3 According to Leibniz’s Law, necessarily for all objects, x and y, if x
and y are numerically identical (i.e. x=y), then x and y are qualitatively in-
discernible (i.e. they have all the same properties and stand in all the same
relations). Leibniz’s Law should be distinguished from the much more con-
troversial converse principle, the Identity of Indiscernibles, according to
which necessarily for all objects, x and y, if x and y are qualitatively indis-
cernible (i.e. have all the same properties and stand in all the same relations),
then x and y are numerically identical (i.e. x=y). For further discussion of
the cogency of Leibniz’s Law style arguments for the numerical distinctness
of coincident objects, see Kathrin Koslicki, ‘Almost Indiscernible Objects
and the Suspect Strategy’, The Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005), 55–77.
4 For illustrations along these lines, see for example Kit Fine, ‘A
Counter-example to Locke’s Thesis’, The Monist 83 (2000), 357–361.
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properties which are apparently shared by coincident objects ‘non-
sortalish’ properties.5
Using Bennett’s distinction between sortalish and non-sortalish
properties, we can thus state the Grounding Problem as follows:
given that coincident objects appear to share all of their non-sortalish
properties, what grounds the apparent differences between themwith
respect to their sortalish properties?6 Although the Grounding
Problem has been raised as an objection primarily against pluralists,
monists as well must formulate some kind of response to the
Grounding Problem. For if, asmonists hold, each region of spacetime
is occupied by only a single object, then we wonder why it is the case
that we nevertheless find ourselves attributing apparently contradic-
tory properties to this single object.7
As Bennett points out,8 the distinction between sortalish and non-
sortalish properties should not be confused with the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, since coincident objects
share both intrinsic and extrinsic properties; and the sortalish prop-
erties with respect to which they appear to differ may also include
both intrinsic and extrinsic properties, depending on one’s view con-
cerning these properties. Thus, the Grounding Problem does not ask
how coincident objects which are intrinsically alike can apparently
differ from each other in other non-intrinsic respects.
Bennett considers three types of responses to the Grounding
Problem: (i) non-sortalish grounds: attempts to ground the sortalish
5 Karen Bennett, ‘Spatio-temporal Coincidence and the Grounding
Problem’, Philosophical Studies 118 (2004), 341.
6 Bennett, ‘Spatio-temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem’,
341–342.
7 For additional discussion of the Grounding Problem, see also Louis
deRosset, ‘What is the Grounding Problem?’, Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 156 (2011),
173–197; John Divers, ‘Coincidence and Form’, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 82 (2008), 119–137; Kit
Fine, ‘Coincidence and Form’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volume 82 (2008), 101–118; Mark Jago, ‘Essence and the
Grounding Problem’, in Reality Making (ed.) Mark Jago (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 99–120; Eric Olson, ‘Material Coincidence and
the Indiscernibility Problem’, The Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001),
337–355; C. S. Sutton, ‘Colocated Objects, Tally-Ho: A Solution to the
Grounding Problem’, Mind 121 (2012), 703–730; Dean Zimmerman,
‘Theories of Masses’, Philosophical Review 104 (1995), 53–110.
8 ‘Spatio-temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem’,
343–344.
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differences between coincident objects somehow in their non-sortal-
ish properties (e.g. by way of a supervenience principle of some sort);
(ii) conceptualism/conventionalism: attempts to attribute the apparent
sortalish differences between coincident objects in some way to our
concepts or conventions; and (iii) primitivism: the position that
objects have whatever sortalish properties they in fact have primi-
tively, and therefore nothing grounds the apparent sortalish differ-
ences between coincident objects. (Primitivism, in Bennett’s view,
is not so much a solution to the Grounding Problem as it is a
denial that there is a genuine question in the vicinity which requires
an answer.)
Bennett takes the first style of response to be hopeless: given that
coincident objects share all the same non-sortalish properties, it is
difficult to see how the apparent sortalish differences between them
could be grounded in their non-sortalish properties, regardless of
the various attempts to the contrary to concoct suitable supervenience
principles.9 The second style of response is also unattractive, in
Bennett’s view, due to the questionable commitments it incurs: pro-
ponents of the second style of response must either hold that our con-
cepts or conventions possess near-magical creative powers which they
do not in fact seem to possess; or theymust allow that objects can exist
with no sortalish properties whatsoever prior to the imposition of
such properties by means of our conceptual or conventional activ-
ities.10 Since Bennett takes both of these positions to be highly im-
plausible, she urges pluralists not to opt for the second style of
response to the Grounding Problem. The third option, viz. primitiv-
ism, is the best hope for pluralists, according to Bennett, though this
response also comes with substantial costs. The apparent unattract-
iveness of primitivism can be alleviated, so Bennett argues, if plural-
ists take on board the following plenitude principle: ‘…every region
of spacetime that contains an object at all contains a distinct object
9 See for example Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A
Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
Michael Rea, ‘Supervenience and Colocation’, American Philosophical
Quarterly 34 (1997), 367–375; Theodore Sider, ‘Global Supervenience
and Identity Across Times and Worlds’, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 59 (1999), 913–937; Dean Zimmerman, ‘Theories of Masses’.
10 See for example Alan Sidelle, Necessity, Essence, and Individuation:
A Defense of Conventionalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989);
‘Rigidity, Ontology, and Semantic Structure’, The Journal of Philosophy
89 (1992), 410–430.
336
Kathrin Koslicki
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246118000127
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Alberta Libraries, on 04 Jul 2018 at 13:35:56, subject to the Cambridge Core
for every possible way of distributing ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ over
the non-sortalish properties actually instantiated there’).11 Bennett
argues that, given this plenitude principle, the question of why any
particular sortalish profile is instantiated in a given region of space-
time can be answered by pointing to the fact that every possible
such sortalish profile is instantiated in the same region of spacetime.
2. A Hylomorphic Analysis of Concrete Particular Objects
The Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism holds that those entities
which are subsumed under it are, in some sense, compounds of
matter (hulē) and form (morphē or eidos). Aristotle first introduced
the distinction between matter and form in response to a problem
concerning the possibility of change he had inherited from his
Presocratic predecessors, according to which change is logically im-
possible since it requires either a transition from nothing to some-
thing or a transition from something to nothing. In response,
Aristotle argued in Physics I that change is possible after all, since
something (viz. the matter) always persists through any change that
occurs, while something else (viz. the form or privation) does not
persist through the change. For example, when some wood (the
matter) goes from not being a bed (the privation) to being a bed
(the form), the wood remains throughout the change, but the
wood’s not being a bed does not persist through the change. After
Aristotle’s initial application of the doctrine of hylomorphism to
the problem of change, the distinction between matter and form
became a cornerstone of his approach to nearly every central phenom-
enon discussed elsewhere in the corpus, including in his treatises on
logic, natural science, metaphysics, theology, ethics, and political
philosophy. I have argued that a hylomorphic approach to the meta-
physics of concrete particular objects is well-positioned to compete
with non-hylomorphic alternative conceptions of concrete particular
11 Bennett, ‘Spatio-temporal Coincidence and the Grounding
Problem’, 354. See also Stephen Yablo, ‘Identity, Essence, and
Indiscemibility’, The Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987), 293–314, and
‘Mental Causation’, The Philosophical Review 101 (1992), 245–280,
though Yablo’s motivation for endorsing the plenitude principle is not
driven by the desire to provide a response to the Grounding Problem.
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objects when evaluated against a range of measures of success.12 The
application of this doctrine to the specific case of concrete particular
objects does not yield a single uniform hylomorphic approach.
Rather, theorists who are drawn to the hylomorphic paradigm en-
counter a series of decision points and desiderata along the way,
leading to a multiplicity of hylomorphic approaches to the metaphy-
sics of concrete particular objects.13 These different hylomorphic
12 See Kathrin Koslicki, The Structure of Objects (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008); Form, Matter, Substance (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018).
13 For other defenses of a hylomorphic ontology, see for example Jeffrey
Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism,
and Material Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Simon
Evnine, Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts,
Actions, and Organisms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Kit Fine,
‘Acts, Events and Things’, Language and Ontology, Proceedings of the 6th
International Wittgenstein Symposium (1982), 97–105; Kit Fine, ‘Things
and Their Parts’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999), 61–74; Verity
Harte, Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2002); William Jaworski, Structure and the Metaphysics of
Mind: How Hylomorphism Solves the Mind-Body Problem (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2016); Mark Johnston, ‘Parts and Principles:
False Axioms in Mereology’, Philosophical Topics 30 (2002), 129–166; Mark
Johnston, ‘Hylomorphism’, The Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006), 652–698;
Robert Koons, ‘Staunch vs. Faint-Hearted Hylomorphism: Toward an
Aristotelian Account of Composition’, Res Philosophica 91 (2014), 151–177;
E.J. Lowe, ‘Form Without Matter’, in Form and Matter: Themes in
Contemporary Metaphysics (ed.) David Oderberg (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999),
1–21; Anna Marmodoro, ‘Aristotle’s Hylomorphism Without
Reconditioning’, Philosophical Inquiry 36 (2013), 5–22; Daniel D. Novotný
and Lukáš Novák (eds), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics
(New York: Routledge, 2014); David Oderberg, Real Essentialism
(New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 2007); Michail Peramatzis,
Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011); Michael Rea, ‘Hylomorphism Reconditioned’, Philosophical
Perspectives 25 (2011), 341–358; Thomas Sattig, The Double Lives of Objects
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Eleonore Stump, ‘Non-Cartesian
Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism’, Faith and
Philosophy 12 (1995), 505–531; Eleonore Stump, ‘Emergence, Causal
Powers, and Aristotelianism in Metaphysics’, in Powers and Capacities in
Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism (eds) Ruth Groff and John Greco
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 48–68; Patrick Toner, ‘On Hylemorphism
and Personal Identity’, European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2011), 454–473;
Patrick Toner, ‘Hylemorphic Animalism’, Philosophical Studies 155 (2011),
65–81.
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conceptions of concrete particular objects, however, share a unique
strength which, in my view, recommends these approaches over
their non-hylomorphic competitors. Those who favor a hylomorphic
approach have at their disposal the ability to attribute to concrete par-
ticular objects an internal structural complexity that is not recognized
by non-hylomorphic alternatives, since hylomorphists associate with
each concrete particular object two principles, matter and form, each
performing its own range of characteristic explanatory tasks.
Moreover, hylomorphists locate these two explanatory principles,
in some sense, inside the objects with which they are associated (e.g.
by counting them among the object’s proper parts or constituents).
This apparatus makes hylomorphism a highly flexible, effective
and powerful tool for the metaphysical analysis of concrete particular
objects and provides hylomorphists with explanatory options that are
not, or at least not as readily, available to thosewho do not endorse the
hylomorphic outlook. The availability of the distinction between
matter and form, I argue, turns out to be useful to hylomorphists
for the purposes of accounting for certain distinguishing characteris-
tics of concrete particular objects, viz. in particular facts about their
structure, identity and unity.
3. Sidelle’s Challenge to Hylomorphists
Alan Sidelle has recently posed an interesting challenge for hylo-
morphists:14 depending on how these theorists conceive of the form
present in a matter-form compound, hylomorphism either offers no
solution to the Grounding Problem; or, if it does respond to the
Grounding Problem at all, it does so in a way that is not proprietary
to hylomorphism, and hence can be adopted by non-hylomorphic ap-
proaches to the metaphysics of concrete particular objects as well.
Either way, so Sidelle reasons, hylomorphism fails to add anything
distinctive to the dialectical situation pluralists face when attempting
to explain what grounds the apparent differences between numeric-
ally distinct spatiotemporally coincident objects.
To arrive at the first horn of the dilemma (viz. that, according to
certain conceptions of form, hylomorphism provides no solution to
the Grounding Problem), Sidelle supposes, for the sake of the argu-
ment, that form is construed by hylomorphists as something along
the lines of the organization or arrangement that is exhibited by an
14 Alan Sidelle, ‘Does Hylomorphism Offer a Distinctive Solution to
the Grounding Problem?’, Analysis 74 (2014), 397–404.
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object’smaterial parts. Given this supposition, so Sidelle reasons, it is
difficult to see why the matter composing a hylomorphic compound
does not also exhibit the very same form as the hylomorphic com-
pound itself. After all, while the matter in question composes the
hylomorphic compound, both are of course organized and arranged
in the very same manner, for as long as the entities in question are
spatiotemporally coincident. At the same time, it is thought to be es-
sential to the hylomorphic compound that its material parts are orga-
nized or arranged in the way that is dictated by the form in question,
but only accidental to the matter composing the hylomorphic com-
pound that these material parts are organized or arranged in this
way. But now, so Sidelle argues, we can see that no progress at all
has been made towards a distinctively hylomorphic solution to the
Grounding Problem, given the conception of form currently under
consideration. For the natural next question we want to pose is how
it can be that the very same form belongs to a hylomorphic compound
essentially, while it belongs to the matter composing it accidentally;
and this question of course presents us with just another instance of
the Grounding Problem. We have therefore apparently landed right
back where we started and the appeal to form seems not to have con-
tributed anything at all to providing a solution to the Grounding
Problem.
The second horn of the dilemma (viz. that, under a different hy-
pothesis, hylomorphism fails to provide a distinctive solution to the
Grounding Problem) requires a conception of form that is robust
enough to block the problematic move just outlined. According to
this more robust conception, it is taken as a brute fact that the form
which is essentially present in a hylomorphic compound does not
also accidentally belong to the matter composing it. (This second re-
sponse, thus, is a version of what we referred to earlier as ‘primitiv-
ism’.) To illustrate, this approach assumes that no further
explanation can be given as to why a statue, say, has a statue-form
present in it, while the clay constituting the statue does not: statues,
according to this conception, by their very nature have statue-forms
present in them; and, since lumps of clay are not statues, lumps of
clay by their very nature do not have statue-forms present in them.
While the account currently under consideration does not fall prey
to the previous difficulty raised above, it does, in Sidelle’s view, suffer
from a different sort of weakness. For since the central thesis of hylo-
morphism (viz. that concrete particular objects are, in some sense,
compounds of matter and form) seems to play no role in generating
this second response to the Grounding Problem, the same style of re-
sponse is also available to theorists who do not share the hylomorphic
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outlook. Instead of appealing to a brute formal difference between
numerically distinct spatiotemporally coincident objects, these the-
orists can point to a brute difference of some other sort (e.g. a
brute sortal difference, a brute difference with respect to persistence
conditions, or what have you). Insofar as the second response pro-
vides a solution to the Grounding Problem, then, Sidelle considers
it not to be proprietary to hylomorphism.
In addition, however, since the second response appeals to a brute
difference between numerically distinct spatiotemporally coincident
objects, Sidelle is skeptical as to whether it even yields a genuine so-
lution to the Grounding Problem at all. For the question at issue was,
after all, to say what grounds the differences between numerically dis-
tinct spatiotemporally coincident objects; and merely to point to the
brute fact that there are such differences, without explaining how
these differences arise, strikes Sidelle as not so much a solution to
the Grounding Problem as ‘a denial that the basic differences
between the objects need to be grounded’.15 In any case, so Sidelle
concludes, hylomorphists are guilty of false advertising, when they
claim that their approach to the metaphysics of concrete particular
objects is superior to others in that it yields a distinctive solution to
the Grounding Problem which is not also available to those who do
not endorse the basic hylomorphic premise.
4. Towards aHylomorphic Solution to theGrounding Problem
In what follows, I argue for a robust hylomorphic pluralist response
to Sidelle’s challenge. This approach rejects the non-robust construal
of form problematized in the first horn of the dilemma Sidelle poses
for hylomorphists, according to which forms lack the robustness
necessary to prevent them from simultaneously bearing the same
relation both to the matter-form compound (essentially) and the
matter composing it (accidentally). Instead, as I argue below, hylo-
morphists should embrace the robust construal of form problematized
in the second horn of his dilemma. Hylomorphists who adopt a
robust construal of form can respond to the remainder of Sidelle’s
challenge as follows. First, hylomorphists need not accept the respon-
sibility of having to provide a distinctively hylomorphic solution to
the Grounding Problem; rather, their response to the Grounding
Problemmay turn on features which can be utilized by hylomorphists
15 ‘Does Hylomorphism Offer a Distinctive Solution to the Grounding
Problem?’, 402.
341
Towards a Hylomorphic Solution to the Grounding Problem
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246118000127
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Alberta Libraries, on 04 Jul 2018 at 13:35:56, subject to the Cambridge Core
and non-hylomorphists alike. (In that case, of course, as Sidelle cor-
rectly notes, hylomorphists should also not falsely advertise that their
solution to the Grounding Problem is distinctively hylomorphic,
when it in fact turns on features which can be adopted by other
non-hylomorphic accounts as well.) In addition, I argue below for
a version of robust hylomorphic pluralism which invokes independ-
ently motivated essential differences between coincident objects.
When conjoined with a non-modal conception of essence, this re-
sponse to the Grounding Problem outlines a strategy for explaining
the derivative modal differences between coincident objects in
terms of essential differences between them that are taken as basic
by the account in question.16
4.1. The Scenario
Let’s return once more to Gibbard’s Lumpl and Goliath scenario
cited earlier. Gibbard asks us to imagine a case in which a clay
statue (‘Goliath’) is fashioned by sticking together two pieces of
clay, the part above the waist and the part below the waist; once the
two pieces of clay are stuck together, a new piece of clay (‘Lumpl’)
comes into existence and the statue, Goliath, thereby simultaneously
comes into existence as well. A day later, Goliath is smashed to pieces,
thereby destroying Lumpl as well.17
16 I myself am guilty of Sidelle’s charge that hylomorphists engage in
false advertising when they claim that their account generates a distinctively
hylomorphic solution to the Grounding Problem. I argued inThe Structure
of Objects (181ff) that a mere difference in formal parts between numerically
distinct spatiotemporally coincident objects is sufficient to yield a distinct-
ively hylomorphic solution to the Grounding Problem. I no longer hold this
position. Instead, as I propose below, in addition to the independently mo-
tivated essential differences between coincident objects, I now believe that a
non-modal conception of essence is also needed to formulate a credible re-
sponse to theGrounding Problem. But hylomorphists and non-hylomorph-
ists alike can help themselves to this strategy; hence, the resulting response to
the Grounding Problem is not distinctively hylomorphic. As long as hylo-
morphists are careful not to engage in false advertising, however, they
should not be concerned if the main features of their response to the
Grounding Problem can be replicated by non-hylomorphists as well.
17 Although this particular case happens to involve artifacts, I assume
that a case in which a concrete particular object and its matter are spatio-
temporally coincident could, in principle, be constructed for living or
non-living members of natural kinds as well. I thus intend my reasoning
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Following a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects,
Goliath is a matter-form compound consisting of some matter, m,
and a form, f. In what follows, I will refer to Goliath as ‘O’ (short
for ‘object’) and use ‘+’ to stand for the relation of hylomorphic com-
position by means of which m and f together give rise to O. We can
then state the hylomorphic claim that Goliath is a compound of
some matter, m, and a form, f, as follows:18
(1) O=m+ f
Presumably, hylomorphists will find it attractive to say that Lumpl,
in Gibbard’s story, just is (numerically identical to) m, i.e.
Goliath’s matter.
Goliath’s form, f, could be construed in a variety of ways, since the
doctrine of hylomorphism as such, as well as its application to the
specific case of concrete particular objects, leaves open towhich onto-
logical category forms belong. Proponents of the ‘universal forms
hypothesis’, on the one hand, take forms to be universal or general en-
tities that are in principle repeatable and can be shared among mul-
tiple distinct entities by being wholly present in each of them at a
single time. Proponents of the ‘individual forms hypothesis’, on the
other hand, take forms to be particular or individual entities that
are by their very nature not repeatable or shareable among multiple
distinct entities by being wholly present in each of them at a single
time.19 Yet others, viz. the ‘hybrid theorists’, reject the dichotomy
in what follows to be completely general and not to turn on any characteris-
tics that might be specific to the case of artifacts.
18 The representation in (1) is an oversimplification, since it ignores the
possibility that O can persist through changes with respect to its matter over
time. Thus, amore realistic representation of the claim thatGoliath is a com-
pound of some matter, m, and a form, f, would have to accommodate such
possibilities as the following: Goliath exists at a time, t1, and at a distinct
time, t2, and the matter, m1, which composes Goliath at t1 is distinct from
the matter, m2, which composes Goliath at t2. For the sake of simplicity, I
will in what follows continue to surpress the necessary relativization to time.
19 Within each of these camps, further choices are available depending
on the more specific ontological category to which forms are assigned (see
Koslicki, Form, Matter, Substance, Section III.2, for more detail). To illus-
trate, universal forms theorists have for example assigned forms to the fol-
lowing ontological categories (where the members of these ontological
categories are of course, in each case, construed as universals): properties
(e.g. Peramatzis, Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics); relations (e.g.
Johnston, ‘Hylomorphism’); powers (e.g. Marmodoro, ‘Aristotle’s
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between universal/general and individual/particular entities al-
together and argue that forms do not neatly fit into either category,
since they have features distinctive of both categories.20 I myself
endorse a version of the individual forms hypothesis, mainly on the
grounds that questions concerning the numerical identity of
matter-form compounds, in particular their crossworld identity, are
best resolved by appeal to individual forms.21
Further, our scenario involves the following three hylomorphic re-
lations: the compound-form relation Goliath bears to its form, f; the
matter-form relation Lumpl bears to Goliath’s form, f; and the
Hylomorphism Without Reconditioning’); or activities (e.g. Aryeh
Kosman, The Activity of Being (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2013). Individual forms theorists, similarly, have a range of options available
to them, depending on whether they take forms to be objects (e.g. Lowe,
‘Form Without Matter’); properties, construed as particulars (e.g. Brower,
Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and
Material Objects); states (e.g. Stump, ‘Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism
and Materialism Without Reductionism’); functions (e.g. Kit Fine,
‘Things and Their Parts’); powers, construed as particulars (e.g. Jaworski,
Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind: How Hylomorphism Solves the
Mind-Body Problem); activities or processes, construed as particulars (e.g.
Koons, ‘Staunch vs. Faint-Hearted Hylomorphism: Toward an
Aristotelian Account of Composition’); facts (e.g. Sattig, The Double Lives
of Objects); or actions (e.g. Evnine, Making Objects and Events: A
Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts, Actions, and Organisms). In addition, if
forms turn out not to fit into any previously recognized category, both uni-
versal and individual forms theorists (as well as the hybrid theorists I am
about to mention) also have the option of designating forms as sui generis
entities.
20 The hybrid position can be found for example in Alan Code, ‘The
Aporematic Approach to Primary Being inMetaphysics Z’, in New Essays
on Aristotle, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume
X (1984) (eds) Francis Jeffry Pelletier and John King-Farlow, 1–20;
Mary Louise Gill, Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Rea, ‘Hylomorphism
Reconditioned’.
21 Since my own sympathies lie with the individual forms hypothesis, I
will in what follows assume that forms are to be treated as particular or in-
dividual entities of some sort. Due to space constraints, I am unfortunately
unable to justify this very controversial assumption in the present context.
For a detailed discussion, see my Form, Matter, Substance, Section
III.4.3; and ‘Essence and Identity’, forthcoming in Metaphysics, Meaning
and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine (ed.) Mircea Dumitru (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
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matter-compound relation Lumpl bears to Goliath. Given the close
connection between form and essence, hylomorphists will want to
say that Goliath’s form, f, in some way figures in Goliath’s essence:22
(2) f figures in O’s essence.
In contrast, it is plausible to hold that Goliath’s form, f, does not
figure in Lumpl’s essence, since Lumpl appears to be related to f
only accidentally:
(3) f does not figure in m’s essence.
After all, even though Lumpl and Goliath, in Gibbard’s scenario,
come into and go out of existence at the same time, Lumpl neverthe-
less could have existed in a scenario in which Goliath does not exist
and in which Lumpl is not coincident with any other statue. In
such a scenario, Lumpl would have existed without being related to
Goliath’s form, f, or to Goliath. Lumpl, therefore, is only acciden-
tally related to Goliath’s form, f, and f does not figure in Lumpl’s
essence.
At this point, an apparent sortalish difference between Lumpl and
Goliath has emerged, as is brought out in (2) and (3): while both
Lumpl and Goliath stand in some relation to the very same entity,
viz. Goliath’s form, f, this form figures only in Goliath’s essence
but not in Lumpl’s. The Grounding Problem, in its current incarna-
tion, now asks what (if anything) explains this apparent sortalish
difference between Lumpl and Goliath:
(4) Sortalish Difference: In virtue of what it is the case that f
figures in O’s essence, but not in m’s essence?
Different hylomorphists will answer (4) differently, depending in
part on how they approach the following questions:
(5) Compound-Form Relation: How is a matter-form compound
related to its form?
22 The term, ‘figure’, is intentionally vague to allow for different ways
of filling in the relation between form and essence. Proponents of the indi-
vidual and universal forms hypothesis alike have the option of holding either
that the essence of a matter-form compound is exhausted by (i.e. identical
to) its form or that the essence of a matter-form compound includes but is
not exhausted by its form, e.g. on the grounds that the matter composing
the compound also in some way figures in its essence, if only generically
(Koslicki, Form, Matter, Substance, Section III.4.2.). Either way a state-
ment of the essence of a matter-form compound will include a reference
to its form.
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(6) Matter-form Relation: How is the matter composing a matter-
form compound related to the compound’s form?
(7) Matter-compound Relation: How is the matter composing a
matter-form compound related to the compound?
(8) Form: What sort of entity is the form composing a matter-
form compound?
(9) Matter: What sort of entity is the matter composing a matter-
form compound?
4.2. Hylomorphic Monism
Hylomorphic monists hold that matter-form compounds and their
matter are numerically identical or numerically the same concrete
particular object: that is, in their view, thematter-compound relation,
at issue in (7), is numerical identity or numerical sameness.23 From
the perspective of themonist, therefore, the region of spacetime occu-
pied by Lumpl andGoliath, despite appearances to the contrary, is in
fact occupied by only a single concrete particular object. As noted
earlier, even though monists deny that Gibbard’s case involving
Lumpl and Goliath presents us with a genuine case of coincidence,
these theorists nevertheless still face an explanatory task of their
own: for monists as well must in some way account for our practice,
as illustrated in (2) and (3), of attributing apparently contradictory
properties to Lumpl and Goliath, despite the fact that, in their
view, the region of spacetime in question is occupied by only a
single concrete particular object.
Anna Marmodoro’s universalist powers approach, for example,
presents us with a version of hylomorphic monism.24 According to
this approach, the pre-existing material ingredients (e.g. the bricks
and mortar) from which a hylomorphic compound (e.g. a house) is
made cease to exist as a result of the process which produces a new
hylomorphic compound. Thus, there is no separate entity or collec-
tion of entities (viz. the matter or plurality of material parts compos-
ing a newly created hylomorphic compound) which is numerically
23 Some hylomorphists have tried to approach the relation between a
matter-form compound and its matter by distinguishing a notion of numer-
ical sameness that is not to be confused with the relation of numerical identity;
see for example Michael Rea, ‘Sameness Without Identity: An Aristotelian
Solution to the Problem of Material Constitution’, Ratio 11 (1998),
316–328.
24 Marmodoro, ‘Aristotle’s Hylomorphism Without Reconditioning’.
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distinct but spatiotemporally coincident with the newly created hylo-
morphic compound.
Marmodoro’s approach has the benefit of escaping the ontological
commitments incurred by pluralists, but only at the cost of diverging
dramatically from the persistence conditions we ordinarily attribute
to the pre-existing entities which go into the making of a newly
created hylomorphic compound. Thus, no brick can strictly speaking
survive the building of a house, even when (as we would ordinarily
put it) all that apparently happens to the brick, say, is that it comes
to be surrounded by other bricks and connected to them with
mortar. In such a case, the brick ceases to exist once it becomes ‘ab-
sorbed’ into the newly created house, though many of the character-
istics which previously inhered in the brick prior to its destruction
continue to ‘live on’ in the newly created house.25
4.3. Non-Robust Hylomorphic Pluralism
Hylomorphic pluralists deny that a matter-form compound and its
matter are numerically identical or numerically the same concrete
particular object: that is, in their view, numerical identity or numer-
ical sameness are not live options for the matter-compound relation
at issue in (7). The Grounding Problem challenges these theorists
to explain how Lumpl and Goliath, despite the fact that they are
otherwise so much alike, can nevertheless differ with respect to
their sortalish profile, as illustrated in (2) and (3). Non-robust hylo-
morphists construe forms in the non-robust way problematized by
the first horn of Sidelle’s dilemma. Given this combination of
views, as will become clear shortly, non-robust hylomorphic plural-
ists make it unnecessarily difficult for themselves to formulate a re-
sponse to the Grounding Problem.
Suppose, for example, that forms are construed in the following
non-robust manner: for Goliath to ‘have’ a certain form is simply
for Goliath’s material parts to be arranged in a certain way. Of
course, if all it takes for an entity to ‘have’ a certain form is for its
25 Versions of hylomorphic monism can also be found for example in
Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism,
and Material Objects; Jaworski, Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind:
How Hylomorphism Solves the Mind-Body Problem; Oderberg, Real
Essentialism; Michael Rea, ‘Sameness Without Identity: An Aristotelian
Solution to the Problem of Material Constitution’; and Patrick Toner,
‘Emergent Substance’, Philosophical Studies 141 (2008), 281–297.
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material parts to be arranged in a certain way, then nothing will
prevent Lumpl from also ‘having’ Goliath’s form, f, simply by
virtue of being spatiotemporally coincident with Goliath. After all,
spatiotemporally coincident objects are composed of the same mater-
ial parts and their material parts are arranged in the same way. Thus,
given this non-robust construal of form, both Lumpl and Goliath
count as standing in the very same relation to Goliath’s form,
merely by virtue of being spatiotemporally coincident.
But now we may ask the question posed in (4): why is it that
Goliath’s form, f, figures in Goliath’s essence, but not in Lumpl’s?
In general, hylomorphic pluralists would be expected to appeal to a
formal difference between Lumpl and Goliath, in order to explain
their apparent sortalish differences. In this case, however, the rele-
vant apparent sortalish difference between Lumpl and Goliath pre-
cisely concerns their relation to Goliath’s form, f. Since non-robust
hylomorphic pluralists hold that Lumpl and Goliath both ‘have’
Goliath’s form, f, in virtue of having the samematerial parts arranged
in the same way, it becomes utterly mysterious how an appeal to
Goliath’s form, f, could possibly help to explain why Goliath and
Lumpl are nevertheless apparently differently related to Goliath’s
form, f, as brought out in (2) and (3).
The lesson to draw from this characterization ofGibbard’s scenario
is not that hylomorphic pluralists in general are unable to formulate a
solution to the Grounding Problem; but rather that hylomorphic
pluralists should reject the assumptions on which the non-robust con-
strual of form and the compound-form relation are based. Where
non-robust hylomorphic pluralists go wrong is that their construal
suggests a reductive analysis of what it means for a compound to be
related to its form in terms of conditions that are so minimal that
the matter composing the compound meets these conditions as
well, merely by virtue of being spatiotemporally coincident with
the compound. With these impoverished resources at their disposal,
it is no wonder, then, that non-robust hylomorphic pluralists have
trouble explaining the apparent sortalish differences between coinci-
dent objects by appeal to their formal differences. As wewill see in the
next section, robust hylomorphic pluralists not only reject the
minimal conditions proposed by their non-robust counterparts;
they also reject the very idea that it is necessary at all for hylomorph-
ists to give a reductive analysis of a compound’s relation to its form.26
26 Sidelle quite clearly construes non-robust hylomorphic pluralism as
a position which, in the course of attempting to formulate a response to the
Grounding Problem, also goes in for a reductive analysis of a compound’s
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4.4. Robust Hylomorphic Pluralism: A Compositional Approach
I endorse the following robust pluralist hylomorphic response to the
Grounding Problem which incorporates views I have developed else-
where:27 (i) numerically distinct spatiotemporally coincident objects
are formally distinct, i.e. they have distinct essences; (ii) these basic
essential differences between numerically distinct spatiotemporally
coincident objects, when conjoined with a non-modal conception
of essence, can be used to explain their derivative modal differences;
and (iii) the considerations on which (i) and (ii) are based are inde-
pendently motivated, i.e. based on reasons not directly related to
our desire to formulate a hylomorphic response to the Grounding
Problem. A response to the Grounding Problem which exhibits
these three features still counts as a version of primitivism, since it
takes as basic essential differences between numerically distinct
spatiotemporally coincident objects. However, since the main fea-
tures of this account are independently motivated and earn their
keep by doing explanatory work, the robust hylomorphic pluralism
I propose below does not simply deny that the apparent sortalish dif-
ferences between numerically distinct spatiotemporally coincident
objects need to be grounded; rather, it outlines a strategy for explain-
ing the derivative modal differences between numerically distinct
spatiotemporally coincident objects in terms of their basic essential
differences.
In the remainder of Section 4.4, I focus on the first component of
my response to the Grounding Problem and argue that we have inde-
pendently motivated reasons for thinking that coincident objects
have distinct essences. In Section 5, I turn to the second component
of my strategy and discuss how an independently motivated non-
relation to its form. For example, the title of Section 2 of Sidelle’s ‘Does
Hylomorphism Offer a Distinctive Solution to the Grounding Problem?’
is ‘What is it for an object to have a form?’ and the question re-occurs numer-
ous times throughout Sidelle’s discussion. As Sidelle recognizes, robust
hylomorphic pluralists, by contrast, reject the idea that they are obliged to
give a reductive account of a compound’s relation to its form, as part of
their response to the Grounding Problem or for any other reason. In their
view, after all, no further analysis in more basic terms can be given, or
needs to be given, of a compound’s relation to its form.
27 Koslicki, The Structure of Objects, especially Chapter VII; and
‘Essence, Necessity and Explanation’, in Contemporary Aristotelian
Metaphysics (ed.) Tuomas Tahko (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 187–206.
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modal conception of essence can be used to explain the derivative
modal differences between coincident objects. Although other theor-
ists may disagree with the details of my account, (i)–(iii) are in prin-
ciple transferrable to other hylomorphic or non-hylomorphic
versions of robust pluralism as well. Hence, the overall strategy I
am proposing does not, and is not intended to, yield a distinctively
hylomorphic solution to the Grounding Problem.
4.4.1. Robust Mereological Hylomorphic Pluralism: The Basics
To begin with, let’s review the basic hylomorphic characterization of
Gibbard’s Lumpl and Goliath scenario stated above (cf. Section 4.1.
(1)–(3)): Goliath is a compound of some matter, m, and a form, f;
Lumpl is Goliath’s matter; Goliath’s form, f, figures in Goliath’s
essence, but does not figure in Lumpl’s essence. Next, given plural-
ism, Lumpl and Goliath, by Leibniz’s Law, are numerically distinct,
since they are not indiscernible with respect to all of their properties.
Given robust hylomorphic pluralism, Goliath’s relation to its form, f,
is not analyzed reductively in terms of conditions that are so minimal
that Lumpl, merely by virtue of being spatiotemporally coincident
with Goliath, meets these conditions as well and therefore counts as
standing in the very same relation to f as Goliath. More generally,
robust hylomorphic pluralists reject the very idea that a reductive
analysis of a matter-form compound’s relation to its form can be
given, or needs to be given.
In addition, I supplement this basic characterization of robust
hylomorphic pluralism with the following further positions. First,
I adopt a hylomorphic conception of matter, according to which
the material parts of matter-form compounds are themselves
matter-form compounds, as long as these material parts are also
structured wholes.28 Secondly, I endorse the individual forms
28 In Chapter II of Form, Matter, Substance, I consider and reject two
main rival conceptions of matter: accounts which conceive of the matter
composing an object as prime matter (e.g. Oderberg, Real Essentialism);
and accounts which conceive of thematter composing an object as belonging
to the ontological category of stuff (e.g. Ned Markosian, ‘The Right Stuff’,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2015), 665–687). The approach de-
fended by Brower in Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change,
Hylomorphism, and Material Objects belongs to both camps, since Brower
holds that the matter constituting matter-form compounds is prime
matter; but he interprets prime matter as belonging to the ontological cat-
egory of stuff.
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hypothesis, according to which forms are particular or individual en-
tities, i.e. entities that are by their very nature not repeatable or share-
able among multiple distinct entities by being wholly present in each
of them at a single time. Thirdly, according to the thoroughly mereo-
logical conception of composition I develop in The Structure of
Objects, both the matter and the form composing a matter-form com-
pound are literally and strictly speaking proper parts of the com-
pound, according to a single relation of proper parthood.29
In response to the questions posed in (5)–(9), this combination of
views gives rise to the following position, to which I will refer in
what follows as ‘(RMHP)’ (short for ‘Robust Mereological
Hylomorphic Pluralism’):
(5′) Compound-Form Relation: f is a proper part of O; and f figures
in O’s essence.
(6′) Matter-form Relation: m satisfies constraints dictated by f.
(7′) Matter-compound Relation: m is a proper part of O.
(8′) Form: f is a robust particular which does not simultaneously
bear the same relation to O (essentially) and to m
(accidentally).
29 Very briefly, my argument in Chapter VII ofThe Structure of Objects
goes as follows. In order to avoid a proliferation of primitive sui generis
notions of parthood and composition, whose characteristics must be stipula-
tively imposed on them by means of distinct bodies of postulates (Fine,
‘Things and Their Parts’), I assume a single notion of parthood, at least
for the domain of concrete particular objects, which satisfies at least the fol-
lowing minimal formal characteristics: Asymmetry, Transitivity, and Weak
Supplementation. (The Weak Supplementation Principle states that an
object which has a proper part must have at least another proper part disjoint
from the first.) By Leibniz’s Law, a whole is not identical to its proper parts,
individually or collectively, since a whole and its proper parts are not indis-
cernible with respect to all of their properties. Next, it is plausible to think
that a matter-form compound has its matter or material components as
proper parts. Suppose now that it is possible for a whole (e.g. a statue) to
be composed of just a single material component (e.g. a piece of clay).
Then, by Weak Supplementation, the whole must have one or more add-
itional proper parts besides its single material component. But the best can-
didates for these additional proper parts within the whole are of course its
form or formal components. I conclude that a whole therefore has both its
matter or material components and its form or formal components as
proper parts, strictly and literally speaking and according to a single relation
of proper parthood.
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(9′) Matter: m is a matter-form compound (assuming that m is a
structured whole); m and O are both concrete particular
objects and hence belong to the same ontological category.30
4.4.2. Essential Differences between Coincident Objects
As stated in (5′) and (7′), the compound-form relation and thematter-
compound relation overlap, in that both the matter and the form, in
my view, are proper parts of the matter-form compound they
compose. However, as brought out in (5′), the compound-form rela-
tion also includes a further dimension, in addition to themereological
relationship between a matter-form compound and its form. This
further dimension concerns the close connection between form and
essence: the form, according to my thoroughly mereological concep-
tion of composition, is a proper part of the matter-form compound;
but, in addition to that, the form also figures in the compound’s
essence, either by exhausting (i.e. being identical to) its essence or
by being included in its essence. (More on the connection between
form and essence shortly.)
Contrary to what is assumed by non-robust hylomorphic plural-
ists, the matter-form relation, at issue in (6′), is not the same relation
as the compound-form relation. Rather, the relation borne by the
material components composing a whole to the form associated
with the matter-form compound in question is that of satisfying the
constraints specified by the form. As I have emphasized in previous
work, among the primary responsibilities of the form within a
matter-form compound is to specify a range of structural require-
ments which must be satisfied by the material parts composing a
matter-form compound. We may think of the form associated with
a matter-form compound, on the one hand, as an entity which
30 I am focused here on scenarios in which a whole is composed of a
single material component. In a scenario in which a whole is composed of
more than one material component, its matter in my view is a plurality of
material components. In that case, each of these material components, as-
suming that it is a structured whole, is itself a concrete particular object
that is analyzed hylomorphically as a compound of matter and form. The
more precise formulation of the hylomorphic conception of matter includes
the following important proviso: the material parts of matter-form com-
pounds are themselves matter-form compounds, unless or until we reach
an empirically confirmed level in the compositional hierarchy at which the
material parts of matter-form compounds are not themselves structured
wholes. I discuss the possibility envisaged in the proviso in more detail in
Chapter II of Form, Matter, Substance.
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provides ‘slots’ to be filled by objects of a certain kind, i.e. a sort of
‘recipe’ for how to build wholes of that kind. An object’s material
components or matter, on the other hand, may be visualized as
what fills the ‘slots’ specified by the object’s form: the compound’s
material components are thus, so to speak, the ‘ingredients’ that are
called for in the ‘recipe’; they are the objects which, in a successful
case of composition, in fact satisfy the conditions dictated by the
object’s form. These structural constraints specified by the object’s
form usually result in requirements concerning the type, configuration
and sometimes even the number of material components from which
wholes of the kind in question must be composed. In addition to
these structural constraints, however, the form also sets other con-
straints governing the object’s material components: in general, the
form is that explanatory principle within a matter-form compound
which accounts for the compound’s structure, identity and unity.31
Given that, as stated in (5′), forms are proper parts of the matter-
form compounds with which they are associated, the logical pro-
perties of parthood and composition, in my view, legislate that
matter-form compounds cannot be taken to be numerically identical
to their individual forms: contrary to the composition-as-identity
model, I hold that wholes are numerically distinct from their
proper parts, individually or collectively.32 The present approach,
therefore, allows us to take a stand against identity theorists who
31 I discuss the structural constraints set by the form of a matter-form
compound in Koslicki, The Structure of Objects. For the form’s role in de-
termining the numerical identity of matter-form compounds, see Form,
Matter, Substance, Section III.4.3; and ‘Essence and Identity’. The unity
of matter-form compounds is taken up in Form, Matter, Substance,
Chapter VII. The three types of constraints I have just identified (i.e. con-
straints concerning the structure, identity and unity of a matter-form com-
pound) are not intended to constitute an exhaustive list of all possible types
of constraints which can be placed on an object’smaterial components by the
object’s form. For one would expect, for example, that specific kinds of
objects are governed by further formal constraints which do not generalize
across the board. To illustrate, in the case of chemical kinds, for example,
the material components composing a molecule, say, must be chemically
bonded to one another by sharing electrons; but in the case of artifact
kinds, the material components composing an ax, say, must be properly
fastened to one another in a different way.
32 For diverging perspectives concerning the composition-as-identity
model, see for example David Lewis, Parts of Classes (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1991); and Composition as Identity (eds) Aaron J. Cotnoir and
Donald L. M. Baxter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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hold that the compound-form relation at issue in (5) is numerical
identity.33
Various options are open to both universal and individual forms
theorists when it comes to the development of a clarified understand-
ing concerning the relation between form and essence. Both ap-
proaches are able to represent the possibility that the essence of a
hylomorphic compound is identical to its form as well as the possibil-
ity that the essence of a hylomorphic compound is not exhausted by
its form, e.g. on the grounds that thematter composing it also in some
way figures into its essence, if only generically. If forms are particular
or individual entities, then a compound’s individual essence is either
exhausted by (i.e. is identical to) its individual form or it includes but
is not exhausted by the compound’s individual form, e.g. on the
grounds that the matter also in some way figures in its individual
essence, if only generically. Alternatively, if forms are universal or
general entities, then the essences under discussion are generic es-
sences shared by all members of a certain kind. Still, this latter
option is also compatible with both of the possibilities just men-
tioned: either kind-essences are purely formal or, e.g. it is also part
of the generic essence of a certain kind of hylomorphic compound
that it be suitably enmattered. Either way, forms and essences are in-
timately linked, since the essence of a matter-form compound is
either exhausted by or includes its form.34
33 The position that a concrete particular object (e.g. Socrates) should
be identified with the object’s individual form (e.g. Socrates’ soul) is
defended, for example, in Michael Frede, ‘Substance in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics’, reprinted in his Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 72–80; Michael Frede, ‘Individuals
in Aristotle’, reprinted in his Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 49–71; Michael
Frede and Günther Patzig, Aristoteles Metaphysik Z, Text, Übersetzung
und Kommentar, Vols.1 and 2 (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck); Lowe, ‘Form
Without Matter’; Jennifer Whiting, Individual Forms in Aristotle, unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1984); Jennifer
Whiting, ‘Form and Individuation in Aristotle’, History of Philosophy
Quarterly 3 (1986), 359–377; Jennifer Whiting, ‘Metasubstance: Critical
Notice of Frede-Patzig and Furth’, The Philosophical Review 100 (1991),
607–639; and Jennifer Whiting, ‘Living Bodies’, in Essays on Aristotle’s De
Anima (ed.) Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992), 75–91.
34 Beyond that, additional commitments concerning the precise specifi-
cation of the essence of a matter-form compound require delving more
deeply into what it means to be an object of a specific kind. To illustrate,
for the specific case of artifacts, say, to state exactly what goes into the
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According to (RMHP), Goliath’s form, f, is a proper part of
Goliath. Even though Lumpl is coincident with an object, viz.
Goliath, which has f as a proper part, f is not therefore also a
proper part of Lumpl. Recall that robust hylomorphic pluralists
reject the idea that they are under any obligation to give a reductive
analysis of a compound’s relation to its form. Thus, the fact that
Lumpl occupies the very same region of spacetime as an object, viz.
Goliath, that has Goliath’s form, f, as a proper part, is not a reason
for thinking that Lumpl must therefore also have f as a proper part.
Although I have adduced general philosophical reasons in my previ-
ous work for thinking that a matter-form compound has its form as a
proper part, these arguments are not offered in the spirit of giving a
reductive analysis of the relation between a matter-form compound
and its form. Rather, as a proponent of (RMHP), I maintain that it
is a basic fact about Lumpl and Goliath that they differ with
respect to their formal parts.
Turning now to (8′), we can use the basic outlines of (RMHP) to
bring us one step closer toward the larger goal of arriving at a clarified
understanding of what sorts of entities forms are. Given the robust
construal of forms, we know that forms cannot be reductively ana-
lyzed in terms of a set of minimal conditions which are simultan-
eously met by the compound’s matter, merely in virtue of the fact
that it materially composes the compound. These further constraints
specification of an artifact’s essence requires a commitment to a particular
essentialist account of artifacts. But those who have proposed such accounts
disagree with one another as to what exactly belongs into a proper specifica-
tion of the essence of an artifact (e.g. its function, the particular creative in-
tention guiding the artifact’s maker, the artifact’s original matter, the
particular creative act in which the artifact’s maker successfully exercised
his or her creative intention, etc.). In addition, in the case of artifacts, we
must of course confront the more general question as to whether a coherent
and plausible essentialist account is even possible or appropriate, given that
artifacts seem to be in certain ways dependent on human minds, interests,
practices, and so forth. For further discussion of the particular case of arti-
facts, see for example Lynne Rudder Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday
Life: An Essay in Practical Realism (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007); Evnine, Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory
of Artifacts, Actions, and Organisms; Koslicki, Form, Matter, Substance,
Chapter VIII; and Amie Thomasson, ‘Realism and Human Kinds’,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003), 580–609.
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that are placed on our conception of forms by the robust construal are
not specific enough to single out a particular choice among the range
of ontological categories available to individual forms theorists. But
they do narrow down our options to some extent by removing from
our consideration approaches according towhich forms are construed
non-robustly.35 If we want to cut down the range of viable options
available to individual forms theorists even further beyond their
status as robust particulars, this choice must be made on independent
grounds which go beyond the considerations raised here.
Next, as stated in (9′), Lumpl, i.e. Goliath’s matter, given the hylo-
morphic conception of matter, is itself to be construed as a matter-
form compound, O*, consisting of some matter, m*, and a form,
f*, assuming that Lumpl is also a structured whole:
(10) O*=m*+ f*
Therefore, Lumpl, on this view, belongs to the very same ontological
category as Goliath; i.e. both are concrete particular objects and both
are analyzed as matter-form compounds, assuming that Lumpl and
Goliath are structured wholes. The same reasons which motivate us
to hold that Goliath has its matter, i.e. Lumpl, and its form, f, as a
35 As noted earlier, individual forms theorists have a range of options
available to them, depending on whether they take individual forms to be
objects, properties, relations, powers, states, functions, activities, processes,
facts, actions, sui generis entities, or what have you. (In each case, the onto-
logical category in question is of course construed as containing particulars
as its members.) The robust construal of individual forms does not in itself
favor one of these ontological categories over another; rather, it rules out
certain conceptions of what the occupants of the relevant ontological cat-
egory are like. The robust construal of forms requires that – regardless of
what sorts of entities individual forms are – they cannot bear the very
same relation both to the compound (essentially) and to the matter (acciden-
tally). Thus, suppose for example that Socrates’ individual form is con-
strued as a particularized property (e.g. a humanity trope) which
essentially characterizes Socrates. Then, the robust construal requires that
Socrates’ humanity trope does not also characterize Socrates’ matter, viz.
his body, even accidentally, despite the fact that Socrates and Socrates’
body are of course spatiotemporally coincident for as long as Socrates is
alive. Nevertheless, so the robust hylomorphic pluralist reasons, nothing
that is human at all is human only accidentally. Therefore, even though
Socrates’ body is spatiotemporally coincident with an object, viz.
Socrates, which is characterized by Socrates’ humanity trope and is so essen-
tially, Socrates’ body is not therefore also characterized by Socrates’ human-
ity trope, even accidentally.
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proper part, apply to Lumpl as well; therefore, we construe Lumpl
similarly as a hylomorphic compound which has both its matter,
m*, and its form, f*, as proper parts.
Notice that it now follows, perhaps surprisingly, that Lumpl’s
form, f*, is also a proper part of Goliath: for f* is a proper part of
Lumpl; Lumpl is a proper part of Goliath; the proper parthood rela-
tion which relates Lumpl’s form, f*, to Lumpl is the very same
proper parthood relation as that which relates Goliath’s matter, viz.
Lumpl, to Goliath; and, finally, this single relation of proper part-
hood is transitive. Since Lumpl’s form, f*, is a proper part of a
proper part of Goliath (viz. Lumpl), f* is therefore also a proper
part of Goliath. Nevertheless, we should not infer from the fact
that Lumpl’s form, f*, is a proper part of Goliath that Lumpl’s
form, f*, is therefore also Goliath’s form or that it must therefore
also figure in Goliath’s essence. Rather, I take it to be a basic fact
about Goliath that f, and not f*, is Goliath’s form and that f, and
not f*, figures in Goliath’s essence; and correspondingly for Lumpl
and its relations to f and f*, respectively. Just as robust hylomorphic
pluralists reject the idea that a reductive analysis of a matter-form
compound’s relation to its form can be given or needs to be given,
so proponents of a non-modal conception of essence reject the idea
that a reductive analysis can be given or needs to be given of facts
about the essences of objects.
We can now return to the question, posed earlier in (4), concerning
the particular sortalish difference between Lumpl’s and Goliath’s re-
spective relationship to Goliath’s form, f: ‘In virtue of what it is the
case that f figures in O’s essence, but not in m’s essence?’. Insofar
as (4) issues a request for a reductive analysis of why Goliath and
Lumpl have distinct essences, this question must be rejected as mis-
guided. The best we can do is to respond to (4) by pointing out that it
is a basic fact about Goliath that f (but not f*) figures in its essence,
and a basic fact about Lumpl that f* (but not f) figures in its
essence. In addition, general philosophical reasons can be adduced
for preferring a thoroughly mereological conception of composition
and a non-modal conception of essence over rival approaches.
Beyond that, however, we must simply accept that all explanation
comes to an end once we have reached facts about the essences of
matter-form compounds that are taken as basic by the approach in
question. While the basic essential differences between Lumpl and
Goliath therefore cannot be further explained in terms of anything
more basic, the fact that coincident objects have distinct essences,
as we will see in the next section, can be used, in conjunction with
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a non-modal conception of essence, to explain why they differ with
respect to their derivative modal profile.36
5. Explanatory Work for Non-Modal Essences
As noted earlier, pluralists, in my view, can hope to make some head-
way towards formulating a response to the Grounding Problem, if
they combine their analysis of concrete particular objects with a
non-modal conception of essence.37 According to such approaches,
36 I said earlier that I will not lean on any special features concerning the
specific example under discussion which arise from the fact that Lumpl and
Goliath are artifacts, since I want to leave open the possibility that a similar
case can in principle be constructed for living or non-living members of
non-artifactual kinds as well. Given that Lumpl and Goliath are assumed
to be artifacts, however, various options are available in this particular
case which may not generalize to a case involving the members of natural
kinds. For example, suppose that the expression, ‘statue’, singles out a
genuine kind, but the expression, ‘piece of clay’, does not single out a
genuine kind. Then, the plurality of material parts composing Goliath
compose a matter-form compound which belongs to the kind, statue, but
they fail to compose an additional matter-form, viz. the alleged piece of
clay, Lumpl, which is spatiotemporally coincident but numerically distinct
from the statue, Goliath. The strategy just outlined allows for a monist re-
sponse to the particular case at hand. I consider the special features of arti-
facts in greater detail in Koslicki, Form, Matter, Substance, Chapter VIII.
37 See especially Kit Fine, ‘Essence and Modality’, Philosophical
Perspectives 8 (1994), Logic and Language, 1–16; ‘Senses of Essence’,
Modality, Morality, and Belief, Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus
(eds) Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman, and Nicholas Asher
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 53–73; ‘The Logic of
Essence’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (1995), 241–273. Other contem-
porary neo-Aristotelians, myself included, have also gravitated towards a
non-modal conception of essence, e.g. Michael Gorman, E.J. Lowe, and
David Oderberg. The conception of essence and necessity advanced by
Bob Hale is similar in many ways to Fine’s, though the label ‘non-modal’
strictly speaking does not apply to it, since Hale takes as basic certain
modal truths, viz. the essential truths, from which other necessary truths
are supposed to be derivable; see his Necessary Beings: An Essay on
Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015). For my purposes, however, we can subsume
Hale’s account under the label, ‘non-modal’, as it is used in the text, since
I have in mind primarily approaches which reject the reduction of essence
to modality and which hold instead that, if any such reduction is possible
at all, it would have to proceed in the opposite direction. The contrasting
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certain facts about the essences of concrete particular objects are taken
as basic and other facts concerning their modal profile (viz. facts about
what is necessary but non-essential to these objects) are regarded as,
at least in part, derivable from these primitive facts about their es-
sences. As a result, a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular
objects, when combined with a suitable conception of essence, can
hope to explain certain of the differences which obtain between nu-
merically distinct spatiotemporally coincident objects, viz. differ-
ences with respect to their modal profile, in terms of differences
between their respective essences, together with whatever further
considerations turn out to be relevant to the derivation of the non-es-
sential but necessary features of hylomorphic compounds from facts
about their essences.
As I have argued in previous work,38 to make headway in explain-
ing how the necessary accidents inhering in a hylomorphic com-
pound follow from its essence, it is likely that we find ourselves
having to appeal not just to the essence of the hylomorphic com-
pound in question, but also to facts about the essences of distinct
but related entities. To illustrate, as Aristotle brings out in his bio-
logical treatises, there is no reason to expect that the necessary (but
non-essential) features of camels, say, can be derived solely from
facts about the essences of camels. Rather, when we inspect
Aristotle’s reasoning in these texts, it becomes evident that he takes
facts about the essences of various other types of entities (e.g.
animals and living organisms in general, stomachs, desertous
regions or earthy material) also to be relevant to a proper explanation
of why camels have the particular necessary (but non-essential) fea-
tures they do. To illustrate, the fact that the palates of camels are
hard and durable, so Aristotle reasons, is at least in part to be ex-
plained by reference to the fact that the palates of camels are made
of earthy material. But the fact that things made of predominantly
earthy material are hard and durable, for Aristotle, is itself directly
traceable to facts about the essence of earth, one of the four elements
model, which does take essence to be reducible to modality, dominated the
metaphysical landscape for many decades starting in the 1970s. For some
representative examples, see for example Graeme Forbes, The Metaphysics
of Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); David Lewis, On
the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Penelope Mackie,
How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Alvin Plantinga, The
Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
38 Koslicki, ‘Essence, Necessity and Explanation’.
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which, in Aristotle’s view, materially compose the inhabitants of the
sublunary sphere in different ratios. Thus, an account of why camels
have the particular necessary (but non-essential) features they do (e.g.
hard and durable palates) may also terminate in facts about the es-
sences of other types of entities which are in some way implicated,
in particular, in the activities, physiology or habitat of camels.
Such an approach is compatible with both the individual forms hy-
pothesis and the universal forms hypothesis, as long as the modal
properties which are supposed to be explained by reference to basic
facts about essences are general modal properties, i.e. modal proper-
ties which are shared by all (or at least typical) members of a kind.
If, however, some of the modal properties at issue are peculiar to par-
ticular matter-forms compound, then kind-essences of course will
not do the trick. I have argued that some such modal properties,
viz. those concerning the crossworld identity and distinctness of con-
crete particular objects, are in fact peculiar to particular matter-form
compounds and should be explained by appeal to facts about the nu-
merical identity and distinctness of their individual forms.39 Thus,
proponents of the individual forms hypothesis can help themselves
to the following consideration in favor of their view: assuming that
particular matter-form compounds have peculiar modal properties
(i.e. modal properties that are unique to these matter-form com-
pounds and not shared by other members of the same kind), individ-
ual forms offer a better prospect for allowing us to ground these
peculiar modal properties in the essences of matter-form compounds
than do universal forms.
A response to the Grounding Problem which utilizes a non-modal
conception of essence will of course not serve to explain all the differ-
ences which obtain between numerically distinct spatiotemporally
coincident objects in terms of other more basic features; rather, it
assumes that all such explanations must eventually bottom out once
we have reached certain basic non-modal facts about essences. To il-
lustrate, suppose for example that a specification of Socrates’ essence
makes reference to the fact that Socrates is a living organism that is
composed of a human soul and a suitable body, while no reference
to a human soul is included in a specification of the essence of
Socrates’ body. Then, the question of why a specification of
Socrates’ essence includes a reference to a human soul, while a speci-
fication of the essence of Socrates’ body does not include a reference
to a human soul, cannot be expected to receive an answer in more
39 Koslicki, Form,Matter, Substance, Section III.4.3; and ‘Essence and
Identity’.
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basic terms, since non-modal facts about the essences of matter-form
compounds are assumed to be explanatorily basic according to the ap-
proach at issue. Given this difference between Socrates’ essence and
the essence of Socrates’ body, however, certain of the other derivative
modal differences between a hylomorphic compound and its matter
can now be explained by appeal to their basic essential differences,
e.g. why upon Socrates’ death his body slowly starts to deteriorate,
whereas during Socrates’ lifetime his material parts interact and
hang together in a sufficiently unified manner to allow Socrates to
engage in various activities that are characteristic of human and
non-human animals, e.g. perceiving, sleeping, dreaming, procreat-
ing, moving, etc.
The crucial piece of apparatus which is still missing from the
robust pluralist response to the Grounding Problem just outlined is
a proper treatment of the relation of ‘following from’which, according
to a non-modal conception of essence, connects basic non-modal facts
about the essences of hylomorphic compounds to their derivedmodal
profile. As I discuss in previous work, both Aristotle and Kit Fine, in
their conception of the relation between essence andmodality, rely on
such a distinction between what belongs to the essence proper of an
object and what merely follows from the essence proper of an
object.40 On both Fine’s and Aristotle’s conception, the de re neces-
sary truths state the necessary (but non-essential) features which
merely follow from, but are not included in, the essence proper of
an object. In order for this type of approach to the relation between
essence and necessity to be successful, we must be able to identify
an appropriate consequence relation which generates the result that
the de re necessary truths about objects follow from basic truths
about their essences. For example, supposing that a specification of
the essence of triangles makes reference to the fact that triangles
have three angles, but not to the necessary but non-essential fact
about triangles that they have three sides, then we must be given
some indication of how the second fact derives from the first.
The approach Fine defends in his pioneering work on essence and
modality in the 1990s certainly has an advantage over the traditional
modal conception of essence, in that it is set up to reflect the sensitiv-
ity of essential truths towards their grounds, viz. facts concerning the
identity of those objects in virtue of which these claims are true. But
40 Koslicki, ‘Varieties of Ontological Dependence’, in Metaphysical
Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (eds) Fabrice Correia
and Benjamin Schnieder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012), 186–213; and ‘Essence, Necessity and Explanation’.
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in this work Fine assumes that the relevant consequence relation
which connects propositions stating what is necessary but non-
essential to objects to propositions stating what is essential to them
is that of logical entailment.41 A triangle’s being three-sided,
however, is not logically entailed by its being three-angled, unless
additional premises are added which take the relationship in question
for granted and hence make the derivation in question philosophic-
ally uninteresting (e.g. that every closed geometrical figure with
three angles also has three sides and that triangles are closed geomet-
rical figures).
Aristotle’s central idea, in contrast, is that the explanatory power of
definitions (statements of the essence) derives from the causal power
of essences.42 This approach has the potential to open the door to a
philosophically satisfying account of the distinction between what
belongs to an entity’s essence proper and what merely follows from
its essence. The relevant consequence relation which characterizes
this contrast, according to Aristotle, is that supplied by his technical
concept of demonstration [apodeixis], as developed in the Posterior
Analytics. Demonstration encompasses more than deductive entail-
ment, in that the explanatory order of priority represented in a suc-
cessful demonstration must mirror precisely the causal order of
priority present in the phenomena in question. In particular, as es-
sences are the causal bedrock of Aristotle’s metaphysics, so defini-
tions, the linguistic counterparts of essences, are the explanatory
bedrock of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. Armedwith a suitable
analysis of causation, Aristotle’s central idea, viz. to trace the explana-
tory power of definitions to the causal power of essences, thus points
41 See also Hale’s distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ essential
truths (Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the
Relations Between Them, 154). The direct essential truths are those proposi-
tions which are immediately, or directly, true in virtue of the nature of the
entities under consideration, i.e. whose truth is guaranteed by the entity’s
definition. The indirect essential truths, in Hale’s view, are those which
logically follow from an entity’s definition.
42 Aristotle divides up the causal responsibilities within a matter-form
compound between the matter, which serves as the material cause of the
hylomorphic compound, and the form, which serves as the formal, final
and efficient cause of the hylomorphic compound. For further discussion
of the causal priority Aristotle assigns to the form of a matter-form com-
pound over the matter-form compound itself and its matter, see my ‘The
Causal Priority of Form in Aristotle’, in Studia Philosophica Estonica 7/2
(2014), Special Issue: ‘Aristotelian Metaphysics: Essence and Ground’
(eds) Riin Sirkel and Tuomas Tahko, 113–141.
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the way towards a promising direction to pursue for those who are in
search of an appropriate non-logical asymmetric explanatory connec-
tion between basic non-modal facts about the essences of objects and
derivative facts about their modal profile.43
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I examined the question of how hylomorphists should
respond to the challenge issued by the Grounding Problem. The
Grounding Problem asks why an object and its matter (e.g. a statue
and the clay that constitutes it) can apparently differ with respect to
certain of their properties (e.g. the clay’s ability to survive being
squashed, as compared to the statue’s inability to do so), even
though they are otherwise so much alike. I argued for the following
robust pluralist response to the Grounding Problem.
According to a robust construal of forms, a matter-form com-
pound’s relation to its form cannot be reductively analyzed in terms
of conditions that are so minimal that they are met simultaneously
by the compound itself (essentially) and by its matter (accidentally)
merely by virtue of the fact that they are spatiotemporally coincident.
In fact, robust hylomorphic pluralists reject the very idea that a re-
ductive analysis of a compound’s relation to its form can be given
or needs to be given. In combination with my independently moti-
vated endorsement of the individual forms hypothesis, we thus
arrive at a construal of forms as robust particulars. A form’s status
as a robust particular does not single out a specific choice from
among the range of ontological categories that are available to indi-
vidual forms theorists; but the arguments I have presented here do
serve to narrow down our options further to some extent, by remov-
ing from our consideration approaches which take forms to be non-
robust particulars.
In addition, my response to the Grounding Problem follows the
thoroughly mereological conception of composition I developed in
The Structure of Objects, which holds that a matter-form compound
has both its matter and its form literally and strictly speaking as
proper parts, according to a single relation of proper parthood.
43 This causal approach to essences is, for example, developed further in
Michail Peramatzis, ‘Aristotle’s Hylomorphism: The Causal-Explanatory
Model’, forthcoming in Metaphysics: Journal of the Canadian Metaphysics
Collaborative, Vol. 1 (2018): “Hylomorphism”, edited by Margaret
Cameron, Kathrin Koslicki, and Michael Raven (Ubiquity Press).
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Given the close connection between form and essence, a compound’s
relation to its form includes a further dimension, which goes beyond
their mereological connection: for the compound’s form also figures
in the compound’s essence either by exhausting (i.e. being identical
to) the compound’s essence or by being included in the compound’s
essence, along with whatever else turns out to be essential to the com-
pound in question. Given robust mereological hylomorphic plural-
ism, it is a basic fact about the essences of coincident objects that
they differ with respect to their formal parts. When combined with
a non-modal conception of essence, this approach leads to a promis-
ing strategy for how the derivative modal differences between coinci-
dent objects may be grounded in their basic essential differences.
One outstanding piece of the puzzle, which is still needed in order
to complete the response I outlined in the foregoing remarks, is a
proper treatment of the relevant asymmetric consequence relation
which connects what is strictly speaking part of the essence proper
of an entity and what is merely necessary (but not essential) to it.
While this ‘following from’ relation must be distinguished from
logical entailment, a positive treatment of it (e.g. in terms of a suitable
notion of causation) poses an, as of yet, still open research project for
robust hylomorphic and non-hylomorphic pluralists who are sympa-
thetic to a non-modal conception of essence.
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